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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
requirements a lenient interpretation which will result in courts
upholding many agency disclosure regulations that courts probably
would not uphold under a stricter interpretation."6 Thus, a lenient inter-
pretation of the "unless authorized by law" exception may have the ef-
fect of limiting the ability of submitters to prevent disclosure of con-
fidential business information.7 7 In addition, because the Fourth Circuit
suggested it will require a reasoned and detailed basis for an agency's
decision to disclose information exempt under the FOIA, judicial review
of the decision will most likely be limited to the administrative record
reducing a court's discretion to reverse the decision to disclose.78 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit's decision in General Motors may not substantially





The federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over all admiralty
and maritime cases.1 The limits of admiralty jurisdiction, however, have
advanced and receded over the years, following the ebb and flow of
judicial and legislative decision-making.2 Traditionally, federal courts ex-
controlling statute on release of the information "unless authorized by law" under some
other statute or agency regulation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976); Charles River Park "A", Inc.
v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (disclosure of exempt information under FOIA
which violates § 1905 is abuse of discretion by agency under § 706(2)(A) of APA).
"' See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra (lenient interpretation of "unless author-
ized by law" exception of § 1905 and effect on validity of agency disclosure regulations).
"T See note 68 supra (submitter's alternatives to prevent disclosure of confidential
business information once court determines disclosure of information by agency is author-
ized by law).
" See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra (court's decision requiring reasoned and
detailed basis for agency decision to disclose and provisions of section 706(2)(A) and (F)).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976). The federal courts derive their powers to hear all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction from constitutional grant and statutory implementa-
tion. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided federal district courts
with exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes involving admiralty matters. Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976)). Further,
the jurisdictional grant carries with it a rulemaking power that permits the creation of
substantive rules of law by the federal courts and preempts state law when exercised.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-9, at 18-21 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
2 See Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the
Nineteenth Century, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1214, 1214-15 (1954). Congress frequently has over-
[Vol. XXXlX
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tended admiralty jurisdiction to all torts that occurred on the high seas
or the navigable waters of the United States.3 The requirement that a
ruled judicially-created admiralty rules that affected seamen harshly. For instance, early ad-
miralty courts held that there was no recovery of damages for death resulting from a
maritime tort consummated on navigable waters. See The ALASKA, 130 U.S. 201, 209 (1889);
The HARRISBURG, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886), overruled, 398 U.S. 409 (1969). In 1920, however,
Congress extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover actions for wrongful death by promulgat-
ing the Death on the High Seas Act. Act of March 30, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-165, ch. 111, § 1,
41 Stat. 537 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1976)); see 2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF
SEAMEN §§ 653-55 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF SEAMEN].
Courts additionally did not permit seamen to recover damages for injuries sustained
through the negligence of any member of the crew. See The OSCEOLA, 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903). Congress abolished the defense of the common-law fellow-servant rule by passing §
33 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, commonly called the Jones Act. Act of June
5, 1920, ch. 250, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1976)); see THE LAW OF SEAMEN, supra, §§ 657-704.
Admiralty courts also did not entertain jurisdiction over injuries caused by a vessel in
navigable waters and consummated on land. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7
(1946). Congress, however, enacted statutory provisions in 1948 that expanded admiralty
jurisdiction to cover damages consummated on land by a vessel in navigable waters. Act of
June 19, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-694, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 740
(1976)); see THE LAW OF SEAMEN, supra, § 6, at 14-16.
The courts have often reflected a paternalistic view toward seamen because they
were largely at the mercy of their employers. See 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 470 n.13
(1981). A separation of powers problem, however, created an element of judicial restraint.
See note 4 infra. The courts, consequently, often rendered apparently harsh decisions to en-
courage the statutory creation of rights. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
215 (1917) (Congress should supplant state compensation with uniform federal scheme); Vic-
tory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1971) (Congress has power to create federal
remedy when state laws provide inadequate benefits for injured seamen); Turner v.
Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, 44 F.R.D. 412, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (court urged Con-
gress to reevaluate issue of exclusive remedy under § 905(a) of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). See also note 4 infra.
I See GENESSEE CHIEF v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233, 242 (1851). The Fitzhugh
Court extended admiralty jurisdiction to all waters of the United States navigable in
foreign or interstate commerce. Id. at 240-41. For a definition of navigable waters, see note
28 infra. In The PLYMOUTH, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865), the Supreme Court interpreted the
strict locality test as equating the situs of the tort with the situs of the injury. Id. at 27-29.
The strict locality test resulted in numerous inconsistent and inequitable results. See note
38 infra. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the strict locality test as
recently as 1971. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 204 (1971) (admiralty jurisdic-
tion denied longshoremen in suits for injury sustained while operating defective forklift on
dock). But see Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); note 7
infra.
In contrast to the rule governing jurisdiction over admiralty torts, the availability of
admiralty jurisdiction in maritime contractual matters requires a conceptual connection
with maritime commerce or navigation. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736
(1961); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932). Consequently, neither
the place of the execution nor the place of performance of a contract determines the exist-
ence of admiralty jurisdiction. Pierside Terminal Operators, Inc. v. M/v FLORIDIAN, 423 F.
Supp. 962, 967-68 (E.D. Va. 1976). Rather, the subject matter of the contract determines
whether admiralty jurisdiction arises. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36, 40-41 (1943).
The separate treatment of actions based on contract theories and actions based on
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tort occur on the high seas, however, denied admiralty jurisdiction over
torts that involved maritime activities such as longshoring and harbor
work, which often occur on land.4 On the other hand, the "situs" require-
ment allowed jurisdiction over numerous activities unrelated to mari-
time commerce, such as overseas air travel, swimming, and pleasure-
boating.' To compensate for this disparity, the Supreme Court, in Ex-
tort theories occasionally gives rise to inconsistent results in identical fact situations. See,
e.g., Dudley v. Bayou Fabricators, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 788, 790 (S.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom.
Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1974) (claim for faulty construction of vessel within
admiralty jurisdiction if based on tort, but not if based on contract); In re Alamo Chem.
Transp. Co., 320 F. Supp. 631, 633-34 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (admiralty courts recognized strict
liability sounding in tort, but not if same action based on contract warranty theory). See
McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 HAST. HASTINGS. L.J. 831, 861-62 (1967) (confusion
as to breach of warranty sounding in contract or strict liability in tort).
' See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 204 (1971) (admirality jurisdiction
denied longshoreman for injury sustained on pier); Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212, 214 (1969) (admiralty jurisdiction denied longshoreman injured on shore while at-
taching cargo to ship's cranes). Judicial restraint on application of state compensation acts
to longshoremen injuries originated in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Jensen held that a state was without power to extend a compensation remedy to a
longshoreman injuried on the gangplank between the ship and the pier. Id. at 217-18. The
Jensen decision left longshoremen injured on the seaward side of the pier without a com-
pensation remedy, while longshoremen injured on the pier enjoyed the protection of state
compensation acts. State Indus. Comm'n. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1922).
Congress twice granted the states the power to extend state court jurisdiction over
maritime injuries consummated on navigable waters. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395;
Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634. The Supreme Court, however, struck down each statute
as an unlawful delegation of federal legislative power. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.,
264 U.S. 219, 225-28 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1920). As
a consequence, Congress passed the original Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act (LHWCA). 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). LHWCA originally did not extend
coverage to longshoremen whose injuries occurred on the landward side of the Jensen line,
see note 4 supra; see, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros. 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946) (longshoreman in-
jured on dock during course of employment not covered by LHWCA); Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 250 (1941) (LHWCA only applies when injury occurs on navigable
waters). In 1972, however, Congress amended the LHWCA in an attempt to mitigate
Jensen and its progeny by extending coverage to certain land-based injuries. Act of Oct. 27,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 1, 86 Stat. 852 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 902, 903). The amended
coverage plan that Congress adopted contains a two-step test. See Comment, The
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Coverage After the 1972 Amend-
ments, 55 TEX. L. REV. 99, 116 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Amendments]. To receive
LHWCA benefits, the worker must sustain injuries while engaged in a type of work that
qualifies as maritime employment. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). Maritime employees include
longshoremen, shipbuilders, ship repairmen, and shipbreakers. Id. Additionally, before an
injury falls under the ambit of LHWCA, the injury must occur within the expanded
navigable waters limit. Id. §§ 902(4), 903(a); see 1972 Amendments, supra, at 103. The
amendments to LHWCA expanded the navigable waters limit to include any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in building, repairing or loading a vessel. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(4), 903(a)
(1976). See also note 44 infra.
I See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 649-51 (1953) (collision of two pleasure
boats within admiralty jurisdiction); Horton v. J & J Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120, 121
(S.D. Fla. 1966) (injuries sustained when transoceanic flight crashed into ocean cognizable in
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ecutive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland6 indicated that the proper
standard for determining admiralty jurisdiction involves a twofold in-
quiry into the situs of the tort and the tort's relationship to a traditional
maritime activity.' In Holland v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,' the Fourth Cir-
cuit emphasized the situs prong of the Executive Jet test by denying a
admiralty); Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327, 328 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (surf-
board injury to swimmer sustained admiralty jurisdiction); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp.
335, 336 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (admiralty jurisdiction proper for injured water skier).
1 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
7 Id. at 261. Executive Jet involved damage to a private jet liner that ingested some
seagulls while taking off on a flight from Cleveland, Ohio to Portland, Maine. Id. at 250. The
plane crashed within a fifth of a mile of land on the navigable waters of Lake Erie. Id. The
district court denied maritime jurisdiction on the basis that the tort did not occur on
navigable waters and that no relationship existed between the wrong and maritime service
on navigable waters. Id. at 251. The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the alleged tort occurred
on land before the aircraft reached Lake Erie, and the court thus found it unnecessary to
consider the question of maritime relativity or nexus. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court affirm-
ed the lower court's decision, holding that land-based intracontinental flights created no ad-
miralty jurisdiction because the aircraft was not performing a traditional maritime activity.
Id. at 273-74.
The Court's analysis focused on the maritime nexus question. Id. at 268-74. Addition-
ally, the Executive Jet Court criticized the locality test by documenting the irrational treat-
ment of different plaintiffs whose maritime status was virtually identical but who received
different jurisdictional treatment based on considerations of locality. Id. at 255-56; see note
38 infra. Certain language in the opinion, moreover, suggests that in some instances the
maritime nexus test should stand in lieu of the locality test. Id. at 261. Executive Jet,
however, did not obviate the locality test entirely. The Executive Jet Court noted frequent-
ly that the locality element remained, but with the additional requirement of a particular
tort having connection with a traditional maritime activity. Id. at 267-68. Unfortunately, the
Court's resolution of the case left the role of locality undefined, since the Court decided that
in the absence of a maritime nexus in intracontinental flights it was unnecessary to decide
the locality question at all. Id. at 266-67.
One may interpret the holding of Executive Jet in several ways. The predominant in-
terpretation of Executive Jet requires a finding of both locality and a maritime nexus. See,
e.g., Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759-60 (4th Cir. 1973) (per*
curiam) (control of water level did not bear a sufficiently significant relationship to marine
activity to permit admiralty jurisdiction); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 260 (9th
Cir. 1973) (physical damage to boat caused by contact with oil slick satisfied situs and
maritime nexus test). Some courts, however, have viewed Executive Jet as retaining the
locality test except in specialized areas such as aircraft accidents or pollution incidents. See,
e.g., Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1973) (admiralty
jurisdiction proper because inhalation of toxic fumes on vessel moored in Ohio river
satisfied locality test); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975, 977 (D. Md. 1973)
(admiralty jurisdiction proper because rupture of oil transfer line in Baltimore Harbor
satisfied traditional locality test). Another line of authority indicates that maritime nexus
has replaced locality as the sole jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., Powers v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 648 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973) (injury sustained by
employee when light bulb exploded on navigable waters did not bear significant relationship
to maritime activity and maritime jurisdiction not proper); Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, 365
F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. La. 1973) (painter who fell from dry-docked steamboat onto land
did not have sufficient connection to maritime activity and admiralty jurisdiction not
granted).
8 655 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3589 (1981).
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longshoreman's attempt to gain admiralty jurisdiction over an action
arising from injuries sustained on land while assisting in the loading of a
vessel.'
Sea-Land arose from injuries sustained by longshoreman Juston
Holland in a work-related accident that occurred on a loading dock and
not aboard an actual vessel." Pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA),1" Holland received im-
mediate compensation from his employer, Nacirema Operating Com-
pany." Holland then brought suit against Sea-Land Service, Inc., alleg-
ing that Sea-Land was a third-party tortfeasor subject to maritime law. 3
The district court reasoned that Holland was a longshoreman engaged in
a traditional maritime activity, and the court exercised admiralty
jurisdiction over the suit." Since admiralty jurisdiction applied, the
district court employed the maritime principle of comparative negli-
gence, 15 rather than the Virginia doctrine of contributory negligence. 6
The jury found that Holland had sustained injuries compensable by 700
dollars but also found Holland to be seventy-five percent negligent in
partially causing the accident." The district judge, therefore, reduced
Holland's recovery by seventy-five percent and awarded Holland 175
' Id. at 559.
' Id. at 557.
,1 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
, 655 F.2d at 557. LHWCA provides compensation to employees irrespective of fault
as a cause for the injury. 33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1976).
11 655 F.2d at 557. A third-party tortfeasor is a party, other than an employer, who is
liable for injuries sustained by an employee during the course of employment. See Williams
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1966). The compensation
remedy afforded by LHWCA is exclusive as between employer and employee. 33 U.S.C. §
905 (1976); see South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 256 (1940). LHWCA,
however, does not affect a longshoreman's remedies against a person other than the
employer. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
' 655 F.2d at 557.
Id. Comparative negligence provides for an apportionment of responsibility, or of
damages, in accordance with the relative fault of the parties concerned. See W. NORRIS, THE
LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 170 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MARITIME IN-
JURIES]. Comparative negligence applies in maritime personal injury cases. Id.; see Ahlgren
v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1954).
11 655 F.2d at 577. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff that
adds to the injury from which the plaintiff seeks recovery. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 416-17 (4th ed. 1971). A successful defense of contributory negligence is a complete
bar to recovery. Id. at 417. Virginia law recognizes the defense of contributory negligence.
See Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Brown, 203 Va. 950, 953, 128 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1962).
Contributory negligence, however, is not a proper defense in cases of maritime tort founded
upon negligence brought in admiralty. See The MAX MORRIS, 137 U.S. 1L 15 (1890); GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 1, § 7-6 at 410 n.70; note 15 supra.
17 655 F.2d at 557. Longshoreman Holland sustained injuries when certain motorized
equipment overturned. Id. Sea-Land contended that the incident occurred because Holland
made a turn at an excessive speed. Id. Holland, however, maintained that the accident
resulted because Sea-Land negligently failed to inspect the trailer, which Holland had at-
tached to the motorized equipment. Id.
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dollars."8 Holland appealed, seeking to increase the judgment, and Sea-
Land cross-appealed and claimed that the Virginia law of contributory
negligence barred any recovery by Holland.'9
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that
the district court possessed admiralty jurisdiction over Holland's cause
of action." The Fourth Circuit noted that Executive Jet had created a
two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction." The Fourth Circuit held that
Executive Jet limited admiralty jurisdiction to actions arising from torts
that occur on navigable waters and that have a significant connection to
traditional maritime activity.' The alleged tort occurred on land." The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, found that longshoreman Holland had failed to
meet the dual requirements of Executive Jet.4 Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit held that the maritime rule of comparative negligence was inap-
plicable to the case and Virginia law controlled."8
The Fourth Circuit has consistently followed the two-prong locality
nexus test set out in Executive Jet.6 The locality nexus test focuses on
both the situs of the alleged tort and the relationship of the tort to a
traditional maritime activity.' Thus, a court initially must ascertain
whether the tort occurred on navigable waters in determining whether
to assert admiralty jurisdiction.' Additionally, a court will deny admiralty
18 Id.; see note 15 supra.
" 655 F.2d at 557.
20 Id. at 559.
" Id. at 558; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
22 655 F.2d at 558; accord, Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759
(4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Ford Motor Co. v. Wallenius Lines, 476 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 n.1
(E.D. Va. 1979).
22 655 F.2d at 557; see note 17 supra.
" 655 F.2d at 558.
Id. at 559.
,' See, e.g., Whittington v. Sewer Constr. Co., 541 F.2d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 197.6) (injury
related to shore-based crane does not satisfy situs test); Richards v. Blake Builders Supply,
Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1975) (injuries related to pleasure boat operation satisfy
nexus and situs test); Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759 (4th Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (regulation of water level fails to satisfy nexus test); Crosson v. Vance,
484 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1973) (water skiing injury insufficiently related to traditional
maritime activity).
" See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §
3676 (1976); see note 7 supra.
' See Calamari, The Wake of Executive Jet-A Major Wave or a Minor Ripple, 4
MAR. LAW. 52, 62 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Wake of Executive Jet]. The requirement
that a tort must occur on navigable water to invoke admiralty jurisdiction originated in
DeLovia v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 420 (C.C. Mass. 1815). At the time of DeLovia, ther concept
of navigability referred to waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. Thomas v. Dane, 23
Fed. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C. Me. 1813). A subsequent case, GENESSEE CHIEF v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 233 (1851), eliminated the tidewater restriction. Id. at 238. The current notion of
navigable waters includes waters that are navigable in fact and are part of a highway for in-
terstate or foreign water commerce. The Wake of Executive Jet, supra, at 62. Navigable
waters would exclude waters never used for transportation or commerce. In George v.
Beavark, Inc., 402 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1968), the court held that certain waters were navigable
1982]
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jurisdiction when the alleged tort has no connection to a traditional
maritime activity. 9 Unfortunately, Executive Jet did not clearly define
the maritime nexus prong of the jurisdictional test.3 0 As a result, the
Fourth Circuit has opted to determine the maritime nexus on a case-by-
case basis.
3 1
Application of the locality nexus test to the Sea-Land facts compelled
the Fourth Circuit to reject jurisdiction over the alleged maritime tort.
32
Longshoreman Holland sustained injuries while working on a pier.3 3 Ad-
miralty courts traditionally'have considered piers to be an extension of
land.3 4 Adherence to the situs prong of the Executive Jet test required
only for purposes of pleasure fishing, and not, therefore navigable for the purposes of com-
merce. Id. at 981. The alleged tort, therefore, failed to satisfy the situs requirement
necessary to sustain admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
I See Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam); Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1973); note 26 supra.
1 409 U.S. at 256-57; see note 7 supra. The Supreme Court appears to equate tradi-
tional maritime activity with a relationship to maritime service, commerce or navigation.
See The Wake of Executive Jet, supra note 28, at 52.
S See, e.g., White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 1981) (installa-
tion of materials designed, advertised and marketed as maritime asbestos products satisfies
maritime nexus test); Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir.
1976), rev'd in part on rehearing, 557 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (cultivation of
oysters does not satisfy nexus test). Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758,
759 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (regulating water level for purposes of generating electricity
does not satisfy nexus test). The Fifth Circuit is the only federal court that has devised a
specific test to determine whether an activity is maritime in nature. In Kelly v. Smith, 485
F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Chicot Land Co. v. Kelley, 416 U.S. 969 (1974),
the court enunciated a four-prong test. Id. at 252. The Kelly court indicated that the func-
tions and roles of the parties, the type of vehicles and equipment used to consummate the
tort, the causation and type of injury, and the traditional concepts of maritime law are vital
considerations in establishing whether a tort bears a significant relationship to a maritime
activity. Id. The Fifth Circuit defined the maritime nexus portion of the test in favor of ad-
miralty jurisdiction when deer poachers, making their getaway in a motor boat, sustained
gunshot wounds from a rifle fired from the land. Id. at 521. The Kelly court focused on
several factors in determining that the alleged tort satisfied the maritime nexus require-
ment. First, the alleged tort involved a boat. Id. at 526. Second, the land-based rifleman in-
jured the pilot of the boat who was in charge of navigation. Id. at 525-26. Rifles, additionally,
are not strictly for land use. Id. at 526. Finally, the court noted that the firing of weapons
was hazardous to waterborne transportaton. Id. The Fifth Circuit has applied the Kelly
jurisdictional test to numerous fact situations. See, e.g., Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 623
F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980) (injury sustained when engineer fell from second floor walk-
way of housing module onto barge satisifed Kelly test); In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489
F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Union Camp Corp. v. Gypsum Carrier, Inc.,
417 U.S. 931 (1974) (maritime jurisdiction proper when smoke from paper mill obstructed
navigation and caused collision).
655 F.2d at 557-58.
Id. at 557.
See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214-15 (1969) (statute covering
injuries upon navigable waters does not cover injuries on pier because piers are extensions
of land); Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 6 (1946) (injuries suffered while on pier and
engaged in loading cargo on vessel lying alongside harbor do not occur on navigable waters);
Minnie v. Port Huron Term. Co., 295 U.S. 647, 648-49 (1935) (substance and consummation of
tort occurring on pier not maritime in nature). The Admiralty Extension Act, passed in
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the dismissal of admiralty jurisdiction over the claim."
Dismissing the .personal injury claim on the failure of longshoreman
Holland to satisfy the situs requirement indicates the' rejection of a
jurisdictional standard based solely on the alleged tort's connection to
traditional maritime activities. The Fourth Circuit requires that the
locality of the tort be an independent requirement for maritime jurisdic-
tion.17 The locality issue, however, frequently presents difficult issues of
fact. Prior to Executive Jet, questions often arose whether the
substance and consummation of a particular tort had taken place upon
navigable waters. 8 The location of the person at the time of the impact
controlled in personal injury cases. 9 Thus, a seaman who fell off a boat
onto land could invoke admiralty jurisdiction. 0 In contrast; however, a
seaman or longshoreman who drowned after sustaining injuries from a
land-based cargo sling could not invoke admiralty jurisdiction.'. Addi-
tionally, an injury that occurred on a gangplank was within admiralty
jurisdiction based upon the theory that the gangplank was an extension
of the ship.42 The requirement that the tort occur on navigable waters,
1948, permitted admiralty jurisdiction to attach even if the consummation of the tort was on
land, provided that a vessel caused the damage. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976). Damages or injuries
on land, however, still were not within admiralty jurisdiction if a vessel did not cause the
damages. United States v. Matson Nay. Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1953).
"' See text accompanying note 23 supra. But see Swaim, Admiralty: The Fifth Circuit
"Returned to Navigation," 19 Loy. L. REv. 617, 622-24 (1972) (maritime nexus test should
control jurisdictional decision). Some courts have relied solely on maritime nexus to grant or
deny admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 648
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973) (land-based pile-driver injured by light bulb hang-
ing over pier did not satisfy maritime nexus); Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F.-Supp.
1225, 1226 (E.D. La. 1973) (painting drydocked vessel not sufficient for maritime nexus). A
few courts assert that the Supreme Court has rejected' the locality test in favor of the
significant relationship test. See Teachy v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 n.2 (M.D.
Fla. 1973) (Supreme Court sanctioned a significant relationship test in Executive Jet); San-
doval v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 996, 997 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (relationship of the
wrong to traditional maritime activity test used to assert jurisdiction over longshoremen's
injury); note 7 supra.
w, See note 35 supra.
3 See note 26 supra.
I See T. Smith & Sons v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1928). In Taylor, a
longshoreman sustained injuries when a cargo sling struck him while he was standing ona
pier. Id. at 181. Even though the longshoreman fell into the water, the court did not assert
admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 182. Conversely, in Minnie v. Port Huron Term. Co., 295 U.S.
647 (1935), a longshoreman incurred injuries when a hoist struck him while he was working
on the deck of a vessel. Id. at 647. The hoist's impact knocked the longshoreman onto an ad-
jacent pier. Id. The Court extended admiralty jurisdiction because the initial impact occur-
red on navigable waters. Id. at 649.
See The STRABO, 98 F. 998, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1900).
40 See Minnie v. Port Huron Term. Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935); note 38 supra.
" See T. Smith & Sons v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); note 38 supra.
12 See, e.g., The ADMIRAL PEOPLES, 295 U.S. 649, 651-52 (1935) (admiralty jurisdiction
proper when passenger injured by fall from gangplank); O'Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring
Co., 354 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1965) (gangplank traditionally part of ship's equipment so that
injury occurring upon gangplank permitted admiralty jurisdiction).
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therefore, frequently produced anomalous results. The Holland decision
may resurrect the anomalies and extend them into the longshoring area.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Holland's contention that the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA43 expanded admiralty jurisdiction to include
injuries arising out of traditional maritime activities performed on
land." Prior to the 1972 amendments, employers were responsible not
only for LHWCA payments but also were susceptible to indemnity ac-
tions initiated by vessel owners who were liable to injured longshore-
men under the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness 5 The burden of
providing a seaworthy vessel lay solely upon the vessel owner even
though the unseaworthiness was the result of the stevedore's actions."
The Supreme Court, however, limited the impact of a seaworthiness
claim against the vessel owner by allowing the owner to obtain indem-
nity from a negligent stevedore.1 A longshoreman, therefore, could
'3 Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
" 655 F.2d at 559. The 1972 amendments to LHWCA made two major changes in the
Act's coverage. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)). First, Congress amended § 903, the coverage section, by expanding
the locality requirement from "navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock)" to include "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel." 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(4), 903(a) (1976); see Gorman, The
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 5 (1974). Second, the amendments further defined the term
"employee," which previously only included seamen and workers hired by small vessels, to
be any person engaged in longshoring operations and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976); see Comment, Broadened
Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REV. 683, 691 (1973). The intended effect of the
1972 amendments was to overturn judicial decisions holding that longshoremen hurt on the
pier could recover only state workmen's compensation. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1969) (LHWCA does not cover longshoremen injured on pier).
See, generally Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Amendments of 197Z An End to Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for
Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 94 (1972); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and
Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 649.
"5 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). The maritime doctrine
of unseaworthiness contemplated that a vessel was reasonably fit for her intended service.
Id. If a defective condition of a ship proximately caused an individual's injury, the ship was
unseaworthy. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 223 & n.3 (1958) (ship
unseaworthy because leaky portholes proximately caused seaman's injury). A breach of the
warranty of seaworthiness established the right of the injured party to recover regardless
of fault. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946); see generally George,
Ship's Liability to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness-Sieraki Through Usner, 32
LA. L. REV. 19, 23-25 (1971) (discussion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness).
"s See, e.g., Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 396 (1954) (per curiam), affg 205
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953) (shipowner absolutely liable for injury resulting from unseaworthy
equipment brought on board by independent contractor); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,
529 F.2d 457, 468 (5th Cir. 1976) (barge unseaworthy because employer negligent in failing
to provide worker with proper equipment to ensure atmosphere free of noxious fumes).
4, See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In Ryan, a
stevedore stored cargo negligently, causing the cargo to break free during off-loading opera-
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recover from the vessel owner under the unseaworthiness remedy and
the vessel owner then could implead the stevedore for indemnification if
the stevedore was negligent.48 The result, described as circular liability,
was the same as a direct suit by a longshoreman against the stevedore,
which the LHWCA did not permit.49 To eliminate this potential for
double payment, Congress amended section 905(b) of the LHWCA to era-
dicate the unseaworthiness remedy for injured longshoremen and pro-
vided that negligence would be the longshoreman's exclusive remedy
against vessel owners."
The Fourth Circuit gave effect to section 905(b) of the LHWCA by
not permitting a longshoreman to maintain a suit in admiralty against a
land-based tortfeasor 1 To permit a longshoreman to maintain an action
against a third party would allow circumvention of the exclusive liability
provisions of section 905(a).5 The LHWCA does not prohibit the right of
tions and injure a longshoreman. Id. at 126. No express indemnification agreement existed
between the stevedore and the vessel owner. Id. at 132. The Ryan Court held' that the
stevedore had breached an implied warranty of workmanlike service and thereby had
become liable to reimburse the vessel owner for any damages that the longshorenian might
recover under the unseaworthiness doctrine. Id. at 134-35. Subsequent cases expanded the
warranty of workmanlike service. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara,
364 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1960) (shipowner has right of indemnity against stevedore even though
injured longshoreman retained by consignee); Crumady v. The JOACHiM HENDRIK FIsSER,
358 U.S. 423, 429 (1959) (warranty of workmanlike service breached when stevedores
rendered vessel unseaworthy); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S.
563, 567-69 (1958) (warranty of workmanlike performance breached when employer failed to
remedy unseaworthy condition caused solely by shipowner).
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
"See Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educa
and Labor on the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1972) (statement of James D. Hodgson).
One result of the right of the vessel owner being able to seek indemnity against the
employer, was that the employer often in effect made double payments, by making LHWCA
payments and by indemnifying vessel owners. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4698-99. The LHWCA,
however, did not require such a result since § 933(a) of the original Act required a
longshoreman to elect between accepting compensation under the LHWCA and seeking
damages in a third party suit. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, ch. 509, § 33(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1440 (1927). Congress amended § 933(a) in 1959, however,
to eliminate the requirement of election. See 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976). The 1959 amendments
did not endorse double recovery and the legislative history indicated congressional desire to
preclude double recovery. See S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in
[1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2134, 2135. Nonetheless, in practice double payments
did occur and Congress responded by enacting § 905(b) of the LHWCA. See text accompany-
ing note 50 infra. The Court has also limited the potential for double payments by strictly
enforcing § 933 of the LHWCA, which does not permit a longshoreman to bring a personal
injury suit against a third party beyond the six-month period following acceptance of com-
pensation from an employer. See Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., - U.S.-, 101 S.
Ct. 1945, 1957 (1981).
I See note 49 supra.
" 655 F.2d at 559.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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a third party, which is not a vessel, from maintaining an action against
the longshoreman's employee. The potential for indemnity proceedings
against the employers, therefore, would reinstate the circular liability
sought to be eradicated by the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. 4
Additionally, in refusing to assert admiralty jurisdiction over
Holland's claim, the Fourth Circuit avoided the possibility of creating
conflict between state and federal law.5 A state has a strong interest in
the promulgation and enforcement of laws that affect the health of its
citizens. 6 Moreover, a state has an interest in preventing litigants from
avoiding state laws by seeking to resolve matters in a federal proceed-
ing." The predominant state interest in adjudicating land-based torts,
therefore, should prevail unless state control interferes with a valid
federal interest. 8 In admiralty matters the federal interest lies in the
development and application of a uniform and specialized body of law.
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). LHWCA provides that the employer shall not be liable
either directly or indirectly to the vessel for any damages recovered from the vessel by an
injured longshoreman. Id. The amended LHWCA defines vessel to include the owner and
the ship's personnel. Id. § 902(21). Apparently, however, any party not considered a vessel
under LHWCA could hold the employer liable in an indemnity proceeding. See text accom-
panying note 54 infra.
See note 49 supra.
655 F.2d at 559.
See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (recognizing propriety
of local regulation in field of safety); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523-34
(1959) (policing of highways province of state law); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 8 (1937)
(state interest in health and safety overrides federal interest in maritime commerce).
" See In re Andrews, 266 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (admiralty jurisdiction
denied when improperly used to circumvent state statute requiring permit to salvage
marine wrecks of historic or archeological value).
I See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 SuP. CT.
REV. 158, 168 [hereinafter cited as Federalism and the Admiralty]. When a valid non-
maritime state interest potentially conflicts with a federal interest, the Court has employed
a balancing test to determine which interest predominates. See, e.g., Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). In Raymond, the Court struck down a number of
Wisconsin regulations implementing statutes that barred trucks longer than 55 feet from
operating on state highways. Id. at 447-48. The Court weighed the asserted safety purposes
of the contested statutes against the degree of interference with interstate commerce. Id. at
443. The Raymond Court resolved the balancing analysis in favor of the federal interests
because the state had presented no evidence supporting the safety purposes of the statutes.
Id. at 444. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized a strong presumption in favor of
highway safety, and indicated that a colorable showing that the regulations further highway
safety possibly would be sufficient to uphold similar statutes. Id.
A similar balancing test does not control analysis of admiralty jurisdiction. In 1959, the
Supreme Court indicated that in admiralty matters the federal interest always
predominates over the state interest by virtue of the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Romero v. International Term. Co., 358 U.S. 354,
355 (1959). But see Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961) (Supreme Court
review of state decisions adequately protects federal supremacy in maritime law).
" See Federalism and the Admiralty, supra note 58, at 163; Wright, Uniformity in the
Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 133 (1925) [hereinafter cited as
Uniformity in the Maritime Law]. Uniformity of admiralty law promotes the free move-
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